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NOTES AND COMMENT
COMMENTS ON TELEVISION AND THE LAW
Introduction
With its advent as a commercial reality, television has inevitably
created and will continue to create new and perplexing legal problems
-problems which in time will probably touch and concern every seg-
ment of domestic law. The solution of these problems will occasionally
require the development of new principles approximated to the special
nature of visual transmission, but in the main, the legal foundation
for TV regulation will be found in that body of substantive rules
known as Radio Law.
But if we are to adopt for this new medium the substantive and
procedural regulations which have governed the operation and de-
velopment of our radio industry, it is imperative that we pause and
examine the manner and merit in which that law has developed and
functioned; and further, it is essential that it be now determined to
what extent our radio law, thus evaluated, is properly applicable to
the special problems of television broadcasting.
An examination of the whole body of law which has developed
with the evolution of radio, or even of the full field of government's
radio-video control is not within the intended scope of this writing.
Instead, it is proposed to examine the extent and effect of sovereign
control in three varying aspects: (1) policy and practice in licensing
broadcast transmission stations; (2) censorship powers of govern-
inent as related to telecasting; and (3) the permissible extent and
efficacy of regulating the technological progress of the television in-
dustry, with particular reference to the problems of color transmission.
Part I
A STUDY IN RADIO LICENSING PRACTICE
THE PUBLIC INTEREST CONCEPT
The avowed aim of Congress in approving the Communications
Act of 1934 was to secure to all the people of the United States the
maximum benefits of radio communication.1 To that end, it es-
tablished a seven-member commission,2 and endowed it with broad
powers to regulate and encourage the fruitful growth of the radio
148 STAT. 1064 (1934), as amended, 50 STAT. 189 (1937), 47 U. S. C. § 151
(1946).
248 STAT. 1066 (1934), as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. § 154(a) (Supp. 1950).
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industry.3 Of the numerous express powers and duties confided
to the Commission, no single provision has been of greater legal
moment than that which vests in the agency the authority and duty
to allocate and regulate the use of radio frequencies and to prohibit
such use except under license. 4
A careful analysis of the prohibited operations of a radio transmitting ap-
paratus without a license discloses that the section is so all-inclusive that it
would require great imaginative faculty to find an instance where the operation
of a transmitting apparatus would not be embraced within the provisions of
the Act. In fact ... all the operations of a radio transmitting apparatus fall
into one or the other or several subsections of the statute and ...under the
Act, none can operate without a license.5
But in the exercise of this comprehensive licensing power, the
Commission is not unrestricted.6 It cannot, for instance, grant a
license without written application therefor having been voluntarily
submitted,7 nor can it refuse to issue or renew a license without
affording to the applicant a full and fair opportunity to be heard."
More important, in considering applications for licenses or renewals
thereof, the Commission is required to grant the same if ".... public
convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby, .. ." 9 and
if it will contribute to the ".... fair, efficient, and equitable distribu-
tion of radio service.. ." among the several states and communities. 10
These two qualifications of the Commission's power are the "touch-
stones" of the whole radio licensing system."
"... public convenience, interest, or necessity ... 
In General
Although the statutory standard of "public convenience, interest,
or necessity" has been held to be not so broad or indefinite as to
render it unconstitutional, 12 the term has persistently eluded defini-
348 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 50 STAT. 190 (1937), 47 U. S. C. § 303
(1946).
448 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 50 STAT. 190 (1937), 47 U. S. C.
§ 303(c) (1946).
5 United States v. Betteridge, 43 F. Supp. 53, 55 (N. D. Ohio 1942).
6 See Regents of University of Georgia v. Carroll, 70 Sup. Ct. 370, 377
(1950) ; Stahlman v. Federal Communications Commission, 126 F. 2d 124, 127(D. C. Cir. 1942); Yankee Network v. Federal Communications Commission,
107 F. 2d 212, 223 (D. C. Cir. 1939); Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 105 F. 2d 36, 40 (D. C. Cir. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 309 U. S. 134 (1940).
748 STAT. 1084 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 308(a) (1946).
848 STAT. 1085 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 309(a) (1946).
948 STAT. 1083 (1934), as amended, 49 STAT. 1475 (1936), 47 U. S. C.
§307(a) (1946).
1048 STAT. 1083 (1934), as amended, 49 STAT. 1475 (1936), 47 U. S. C.
307(b) (1946).
1" See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U. S. 134, 138 (1940).
12 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943).
[ VOL. 25
NOTES AND COMMENT
tion, either by the courts or by the Commission.13 It has been said,
however, that the congressional grant of power to the communications
agency is not an unlimited one,14 and that in exercising its authority,
the Commission may not act unconstitutionally, arbitrarily, or capri-
ciously.15 Just what is conduct unconstitutional, arbitrary, or capri-
cious-like the statutory standard it purports to restrict-has never
been quite clear. But the courts have willingly recited what it is
not.16 It is not, for example, arbitrary, capricious, or unconstitutional
for the Commission to proscribe and enforce rules for the regulation
of chain (network) broadcasting. 17 Nor do the commissioners ex-
ceed their authority when they inquire into the moral qualifications
of a license applicant.18 Also, it is permissible for the Commission
to abandon its own policy as expressed in the decided cases,' 9 and,
without abusing their discretion, the commissioners may at any time
review the action of a licensee in selecting his programs.20
But, even though no attempt has been made to measure the
standard of "public convenience, interest, or necessity," there has
been some effort at least, to crystallize the policies with which the
Commission, itself, has implemented the statutory mandate.
2
'
The Commission's established yardstick for determining public convenience
includes a showing of citizenship on the part of the applicant, a need of ser-
vice at the place in question, the ability of the community to support the sta-
tion and to furnish what is called "talent," the ability of the applicant to fi-
nance its construction and operation, a finding that an objectionable interference
will result to some other operating station, and that the plant and service pro-
posed will comport with the Commission's rules. Upon an affirmative showing,
to the satisfaction of the Commission in these respects . . . the applicant is
entitled under the law to the permit.2 2
13 "To be able to arrive at a precise definition of such a phrase which will
foresee all eventualities is manifestly impossible." 2 FRC ANN. REP. 166(1928).14 See note 6 mSpra.
1 5 See WOKO, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 153 F. 2d 623,
628 (D. C. Cir. 1946), reV'd on other grounds, 329 U. S. 223 (1946).
16 Occasionally, the courts have branded Commission rulings as arbitrary,
capricious or unconstitutional. See Plains Radio Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 175 F. 2d 359 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
1I National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943).
IsMester v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 118 (E. D. N. Y.), affd, 332
U. S. 749 (1947).
29 Courier Post Pub. Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 104 F.
2d 213 (D. C. Cir. 1939). .20 See Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth and Rogers Co.,
87 F. Supp. 822, 824 (D. Mass. 1949).
21 "The Commission's right to grant licenses or to revoke licenses in the
public interest, and likewise to make rules and regulations necessary to the
carrying out of the provisions of the Act, implies the grant of all means neces-
sary or appropriate to the discharge of the powers expressly granted." Stahl-
man v. Federal Communications Commission, 126 F. 2d 124, 128 (D. C. Cir.
1942).
22 Colonial Broadcasters v. Federal Communications Commission, 105 F. 2d
781, 783 (D. C. Cir. 1939).
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Query: what is an affirmative showing to the satisfaction of the
Commission?
Legal Qualifications
Persons who are not American citizens are prohibited from re-
ceiving or holding station license grants under the provisions of
Section 310 of the Communications Act.2 3  Corporations which are
organized under the laws of a foreign government, or which include
on their board of directors or as an officer, any alien, or which are
controlled by any other corporation of which any officer or more than
one-fourth of the directors are aliens are similarly excluded from be-
coming licensees. 24 Elsewhere in the Act, it is provided that appli-
cations for station licenses ". . . shall set forth such facts as the
Commission by regulations may prescribe as to the citizenship ...
of the applicant . *.".. 25 Taken together, these provisions of the
Act have been construed to require that applicants offer affirmative
proof of American citizenship when filing requests for broadcast
permits.26 And the provisions which relate to corporate applicants
have been deemed applicable to unincorporated associations. 27 Gen-
erally, the Commission. requires direct proof of an applicant's citi-
zenship,28 but, as an administrative body, it is not limited to strict
rules of evidence,29 and may, at times, allow an application without
such direct proof.8 0
On the whole, the congressional mandate in this respect is clear;
there would seem to be little opportunity for deviation from the
statutory standard, and in fact there has not been.81
Other aspects of legal qualification are raised when the appli-
cant, instead of being an individual, is a corporation or other legal
entity. Thus, a corporate applicant has been refused a license for
failure to "qualify" 82 under the laws of the state where it proposed
to do business; and the application of an alleged partnership was
similarly denied when it failed to evidence written articles of agree-
ment
3 4
2348 STAT. 1086 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §310 (1946).
24 Ibid.
25 48 STAT. 1089 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 319 (1946).2 8Re Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, FCC
DocKET NO. 8870, FCC 5OD-63 (December 29, 1950).
27 Ibid.
28 Re Tri-City Broadcasting Co., 7 F. C. C. 80 (1939) ; Re Voice of Detroit,
6 F. C. C. 363 (1938).29 See Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,
96 F. 2d 564, 566 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
30 See Re Kentucky Broadcasting Corp., 6 F. C. C. 536 (1938).
31 In the reported cases, this aspect of" legal qualification is usually dis-
posed of with a simple recitation of the applicant's citizenship.
32 The word "qualify" as here used, means that the corporation is author-
ized to do an intrastate business within the state in question.3 3 Re Pee Dee Broadcasting Co., 7 F. C. C. 394 (1939).34 Re Carter, 2 F. C. C. 544 (1936).
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Financial Qualification
Congress has empowered the Commission to make proof of finan-
cial ability a requisite for ownership of a broadcasting permit.35
The question of financial qualification has at least two aspects: first, has the
applicant enough resources to construct the station and to operate it for a
brief period of time; and second, is there a reasonable likelihood of financial
profit to be expected from the operation of the station or are the applicant's
personal resources such that he is able and willing to operate a station for a
considerable period of time at a loss.30
At first blush, the determination of an applicant's financial quali-
fications would seem to be a comparatively simple procedure involving
the more or less mechanical application of fixed minimum standards.
In practice, however, this has not been so. Instead, the Commission
has adopted a vacillating standard with policy and procedure seeming
to vary with each new fact problem. In some reported cases, for
example, the Commission has subjected an applicant's financial status
to a detailed and exhaustive study,3 7 while in others, discussion of
the petitioner's pecuniary resources has been confined to a mere reci-
tation of his financial responsibility.3 8
A problem which has frequently confronted the Commission in
determining an applicant's financial eligibility, arises where the pe-
titioner predicates his financial responsibility on the promise of some
third party to advance money if the pending application is approved.
In such cases, it is the uniform practice to subject the asserted ar-
rangement to a close scrutiny. Unfortunately, however, there seems
to be no such uniformity or continuity of Commission policy when
it comes to making a determination in such cases. Thus, in some
cases, failure to evidence the financial ability of the third party prom-
isor has resulted in the Commission's refusal to grant the requested
license,3 9 while in others, no proof of the third party's financial
responsibility has been required.40 In some cases, the fact that the
promise to advance money was not in writing has proved fatal to
35 "This application shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regu-
lation may prescribe as to the... financial... ability of the applicant to con-
struct and operate the station... ." 48 STAT. 1089 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 319(a)(1946).
36 Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 96 F.
2d 554, 562 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
37 See Re Caldarone, 7 F. C. C. 212 (1939); Re Casto, 6' F. C. C. 114(1938); Re Hughes, 5 F. C. C. 120 (1938); Re Times Publishing Co., 4 F. C. C.
400 (1937).
38 See Re Power City Broadcasting Co., 4 F. C. C. 227 (1937) ; Re Reporter
Broadcasting Co., 2 F. C. C. 518 (1936).39Re Smith, 5 F. C. C. 291 (1938) ; Re Amelung, 1 F. C. C. 181 (1934).40 Re Williamson Broadcasting Corp., 6 F. C. C. 665 (1938); Re Brown-
wood Broadcasting Co., 4 F. C. C. 281 (1937).
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the application, 41 but again, in others, proof of a parol promise has
been deemed sufficient evidence of financial worth.
42
Still another aspect of financial qualification presents itself where
the applicant has agreed to form a corporation at a later date, assign
his license to such corporation, and issue stock therein as security
for a loan to be advanced by some third party. Prior to 1937, it
was the policy of the FCC to reject applications which revealed such
proposals on the ground that to approve them would deprive the
Commission of its right to evaluate the qualifications of "the real
party in interest." 43 So grounded, the policy of the Commission
was open to severe criticism, for it presupposed the weakness of its
own power to regulate station license transfers. An examination of
the assignment provisions in the Communications Act discloses the
invalidity of any such supposition. 44
Another ratio decidendi for its refusal to issue permits in these
cases was announced by the Commission in the now famed Heitmeyer
ruling.45 There the record disclosed that the applicant had intended,
in the event that his application was approved, to form a corporation
and request the consent of the Commission to assign his franchise
to it. In the event that a loan made by one Glassman to the appli-
cant was not repaid according to its terms, the latter was obligated
to assign to Glassman 49% of the stock of the proposed corporation.
The Commissioners concluded that the applicant was not financially
qualified to assume the responsibilities of a broadcast licensee. It
reasoned as one of two alternative propositions that to grant the
petitioner's request would, in effect, require the Commission to pre-
judge an application (for the assignment of license from Heitmeyer
to the proposed corporation) which was not before it. This, it con-
cluded, was beyond its power. Consequently, the applicant's financial
structure was dependent upon some future unpredictable happening,
and was therefore unsound.
41 Re Thomas, 5 F. C. C. 124 (1938) ; Re Howitt Wood Radio Co., 2 F. C. C.
588 (1936).
42 Re Anderson, 4 F. C. C. 463 (1937).
43 Re Replogle, 1 F. C. C. 256, 257 (1935). Actually, the application in the
Replogle case did not reveal an intent to form a corporation subsequent to
grant of the requested permit. According to the Commission findings, the ap-
plicant was a mere "dummy," the real party in interest being the Boston
Herald-Traveler Corporation. We cite the case because its philosophy-the
real party in interest concept-became the true basis for the Commission's re-
fusal to grant permits in cases of application prior to incorporation. See Re
Porter, 4 F. C. C. 680 (1937); Re Press Democrat Publishing Co., 3 F. C. C.
544 (1936) ; Re Hughes, 2 F. C. C. 85 (1935).
44 "The station license required hereby, the frequencies authorized to be
used by the licensee, and the rights therein granted shall not be transferred,
assigned or in any manner either voluntarily or involuntarily disposed of, or
indirectly by transfer of control of any corporation holding such license, to
any person, unless the Commission shall, after securing full information, de-
cide that said transfer is in the public interest, and shall give its consent in
writing." 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 310(b) (1946). Emphasis
supplied.
45 2 F. C. C. 601 (1936).
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On appeal,4 6 however, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia rejected the reasoning advanced by the Commission, and
declared that if the refusal to grant the license rested on so tenuous
a ground, it verged closely on arbitrary and capricious action.47  Said
the court:
It would seem to be a rather idle and expensive gesture to require the forma-
tion of a corporation for such a purpose before the securing of a construc-
tion permit, when a refusal to grant the permit would automatically abort the
whole occasion and purpose of the corporation. It would seem on its face to
be a rather severe restriction upon business enterprise and an unnecessary
limitation upon the availability of radio service in a particular community.48
The quoted passage appeared in the Heitmeyer case only as
dictum,4 9 but the tenor of its warning prompted the Commission to
alter its policy and adopt a more lenient attitude toward applicants
who filed in contemplation of subsequent incorporation. This would
seem to be the better course.50
A necessary element of financial qualification is the applicant's
ability to either personally sustain or to make self-sustaining the
continued operation of the proposed station.51 In most cases, there-
fore, the Commission very properly requires that a prospective licensee
submit evidence that operation of the proposed station will be com-
mercially feasible . 2  Then too, since few stations are self-supporting
from their inception, the applicant may also be required to furnish
proof that he has sufficient reserve capital with which to finance opera-
tion of the station from the time it begins broadcasting to the time
it commences to realize a profit.53 The determination of commercial
feasibility and the fixing of an amount necessary to sustain operation
during the interim period, are matters dependent on many factors.
"16The procedure governing appeals from decisions of the Commission is
set forth in Section 402 of the Act. 48 STAT. 926 (1934), as amended, 47
U. S. C. A. § 402 (Supp. 1950).
7 Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Commission, 95 F. 2d 91, 97 (D.
C. Cir. 1937).
48 Ibid.
49Id. at 98. "However, we are not required to decide this question because
the first alternative contention of the Commission is not supported by the
findings."
c Cf. Great Western Broadcasting Association v. Federal Communications
Commission, 94 F. 2d 244, 247 (D. C. Cir. 1937). For an excellent discus-
sion of the Heitmeyer and related cases, see Warner, The Administrative
Process of the Federal Communications Commission, 19 So. CALIF. L. REv. 191
(1945).5 1 See Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,
96 F. 2d 554, 562 (D. C. Cir. 1938).52 See Re Pinellas Broadcasting Co., 7 F. C. C. 132 (1939); Re Pacific
Radio Corporation, 6 F. C. C. 475 (1938); Re Banks of Wabash, 5 F. C. C.
475 (1938); Re Katzentine, 4 F. C. C. 204 (1937); Re Webb, 1 F. C. C. 267
(1935).
53 See Re Webb, .rpra note 52 (application granted); Re Kansas City
Broadcasting Co., FCC DocxET No. 8415, FCC 5OD-63 (December 29, 1950)
(application denied on other grounds).
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These factors will be discussed in the section on community need,
infra.
Public Interest in Program Service
It has been frequently and forcefully argued that Congress never
intended to vest in the FCC the power to concern itself with the
program service of licensees. 54 Instead, it is urged that the primary
aim of the lawmaking body in inaugurating radio controls was to so
regulate use of the spectrum that one station would not conflict signals
physically with another.5 5 On the other hand, neither the FCC nor
its predecessor, the Radio Commission, ever doubted that the power
to regulate radio in the public interest included the right to consider
program service in determining what best serves that interest.5 6 In-
deed, the present Commission has declared that it has not only the
authority, but the positive duty to do so.57 This assertion has been
confirmed by the courts.6 8
Congress, itself, has set forth certain requirements and prohibi-
tions relative to program content. Thus, it is prohibited: (1) to
utter obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio com-
munication; 59 or (2) to broadcast any advertising or information
concerning a lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme; 60 or (3) to
rebroadcast the programs, or parts thereof, of another broadcasting
station without the express authority of the originating station.61
Affirmatively, it is required that broadcasters afford equal opportuni-
ties to all legally qualified candidates for a given political office if
time is granted to any candidate for such office.62  Also, any broad-
cast for which compensation is paid by any person, must, at the time
it is broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished by such person.63
Similarly, the recently enacted Subversive Activities Control Law 4
provides that all broadcasts sponsored by Communist organizations,
must be preceded by the statement: "The following program is
54 See, e.g., the extension of remarks of the Hon. Clare Hoffman of Michi-
gan in the House of Representatives, reading from an editorial in the Wash-
ington Times-Herald. 93 CONG. Rc. A4905 (1947).5s Ibid.
56 See 2 FRC Axw. REP. 161 (1928).
5" F. C. C. REPORT ON PUBLIC SzRvicE RESPONSmILITY OF BROADCAST
LIcENSEEs 12 (1946).58 See Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and Other States v.
Federal Communications Commission, 105 F. 2d 793, 795 (D. C. Cir. 1939);
Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F. 2d 850,
853 (D. C. Cir. 1932); KFKB Broadcasting Association v. Federal Radio
Commission, 47 F. 2d 670, 672 (D. C. Cir. 1931); Massachusetts. Universalist
Convention v. Hildreth and Rogers Co., 87 F. Supp. 822, 824 (D. Mass.
1949).
59 18 U. S. C. § 1464 (1948).
60 18 U. S. C. § 1304 (1948).
6148 STAT. 1091 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §325 (1946).
6248 STAT. 1088 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §315 (1946).
6348 STAT. 1089 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §317 (1946).
64 Pub. L. No. 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 23, 1950).
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sponsored by , a Communist organization." 65 On the other
hand, the power to censor radio broadcasts has been expressly denied
to the Commission.66 Quaere: if in enumerating these certain restric-
tions on program content, Congress did not intend to define the ex-
tent of FCC authority in evaluating the program activity of the
licensee?
The courts have answered in the negative,67 and, as before, they
have fixed the limits of Commission power at the illusory border of
conduct arbitrary, capricious, or unconstitutional. Within this limit,
the Commission has power to scrutinize program content,68 and fix
standards of conduct to which license applicants must subscribe, and
licensees adhere, at the risk of being denied use of the airways. 69
The programming practices of a given applicant may come under
scrutiny in one of three ways: (1) upon an original application for
permission to construct and operate proposed broadcast facilities; 70
or (2) upon an application to renew the license of an existing sta-
tion; 71 or (3) in proceedings to revoke an outstanding license.72
Where the application is one for the grant of a license to operate
new or proposed facilities, it is generally required that the prospective
licensee set forth in detail his proposals for broadcast service to the
community which he plans to serve.7 3 The standard practice of appli-
cants, in these cases, is to submit a tentative program schedule, illus-
trating how well the various facets of the proposed schedule are
integrated to the needs of the area in which the station will be lo-
cated.74 In addition, testimony may be adduced to show that various
civic and religious groups have agreed to accept time on the proposed
station and in turn provide it with suitable program material. 75 It
may be shown that a contract with a broadcast network, tentative
upon the acceptance of the application, will enable the proposed outlet
to link the community with program services to which it previously
has had no access.76 Conversely, if the community is already serviced
65 Pub. L. No. 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(2) (Sept. 23, 1950).
6648 STAT. 1091 (1934), as amended, 62 STAT. 862 (1948), 47 U. S. C. A.
§326 (Supp. 1950).See note 58 supra.
6 Plains Radio Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,
175 F. 2d 359 (D. C. Cir. 1949).69 Bay State Beacon v. Federal Communications Commission, 171 F. 2d
826 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
70 See Re Citizens Broadcasting Corp., 6 F. C. C. 669 (1938); Re Brown-
wood Broadcasting Co., 4 F. C. C. 281 (1937).
71 See Re WNAX Broadcasting Co 6 F. C. C. 397 (1938); Re May Seed
and Nursery Co., 2 F. C. C. 559 (19365.72 Re Scott, 11 F. C. C. 372 (1946).
73 See Re Goldwasser, 4 F. C. C. 223 (1937) ;Re Union Tribune Publishing
Co., 3 F. C. C. 451 (1936); Re Clifford, 2 F. C. C. 573 (1936).74 See, e.g., Re Citizens Broadcasting Corp., 6 F. C. C. 669 (1938).
75 See Re Voice of Detroit, 6 F. C. C. 363 (1938).7 6 See Plains Radio Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 175 F. 2d 359, 362 (D. C. Cir. 1949). The Commission had granted the
application of the intervenor on the ground that its proposed program service
1951 ]
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by one or more outlets, it may be shown in support of the application,
that network commitments prevent existing stations from adequately
serving the local needs of the community.77 Of course, in all appli-
cations for new facilities, the licensees of existing outlets have the
right to challenge the entry of newcomers into the broadcast com-
munity.78  Such licensees can attack the program proposals of an
applicant on the ground that such proposals, if activated, will not
serve public interest, convenience or necessity.79 Rival applicants
have a similar right.8 0
Where the application is one for the renewal of a license to
operate existing facilities, the Commission has served notice that it
intends to compare a licensee's performance with his program prom-
ises.8' This would seem to be the proper course, for, once it be
conceded that the Commission has the right to exact performance
promises from the station applicant, logic demands that it have the
right to see how well those promises have been kept.
Perhaps the most frequent criticism leveled against those who
administer our radio controls has been their failure to enunciate
and follow a consistent rule of decision principle.8 2 In March, 1946,
the Commission attempted to remedy this failing, in part at least,
by "codifying" its policies on programming in the now famous report
on the Public Service Responsibility of Brodcast Licensees.8 3 The
i:eport, popularly known as the Bluebook, was a resume of past prac-
tice, and a statement of future policy:
was superior to that of the appellant. Intervenor's proposals were based mainly
on the possibility of a network affiliation with the Mutual Broadcasting Co.
The Commission was reversed when the court found no basis for intervenor's
claim to a contract with the Mutual system.
77 Re Osborn, Jr., 5 F. C. C. 453 (1938) ; Re Missouri Broadcasting Corp.,
3 F. C. C. 349 (1936).78 Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 48 F. 2d 461 (D. C. Cir.
1931). See Woodmen of the World v. Federal Communications Commission,
105 F. 2d 75, 77 (D. C. Cir. 1939).
71 Cf. Re Stenger, Jr., 2 F. C. C. 51 (1936). The operators of each of two
stations, serving the greater Wilkes-Barre (Pa.) area, applied for construc-
tion permits to increase the time of operation of their respective stations.
Grant of such permit to either would necessitate the elimination of the other.
Each submitted program proposals, and each contended that his respective plan
for service justified an award as against the other. The Commission concluded
that neither station had shown such proposals for service in the public interest
as would justify the grant of a time increase to one, with the consequent elim-
ination of the other.
80 See Plains Radio Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 175 F. 2d 359 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
81 FCC MimEoGrAPHr No. 81575 (April 10, 1945).
82 See Comment, 18 U. OF CHL L. REv. 78, 91 (1950) ; Note, 36 VA. L. REV.
232, 249 (1950). For a more flamboyant criticism of the Comion see 93
CONG. REc. A4905 (1947). "The )Federal Communications Comision is
notoriously the most incompetent, quack-brained organization ever devised by
the New Deal. From the time it was formed in 1934 down to this very day
it has never been out of trouble and what is more, trouble of its own making."
83 Hereafter cited as TiE BLuEmooK.
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In issuing and in renewing the licenses of broadcast stations the Commission
proposes to give particular consideration to four program service factors rele-
vant to the public interest. These are: (1) the carrying of sustaining pro-
grams, including network sustaining programs, with particular reference to the
retention by licensees of a proper discretion and responsibility for maintaining
a well-balanced program structure; (2) the carrying of local live programs;
(3) the carrying of programs devoted to the discussion of public issues, and
(4) the elimination of advertising excesses. 84
Sustaining Programs s8 -- In weighing the merits of a given appli-
cation, the Commission has always asserted its right to consider as a
factor, the relative amounts of commercial 86 and non-commercial
programs featured or proposed to be featured by the licensee appli-
cant. 7 It justifies this policy with the assertion that non-commercial
or sustaining 8 programs serve five distinctive and outstanding func-
tions, which commercial programs cannot:, (1) they secure for the
station a means by which it can achieve a balanced interpretation of
public needs; (2) they provide for the broadcast of programs which
by their very nature cannot be sponsored with propriety; (3) they
provide for the program needs and purposes of non-profit organiza-
tions; (4) they provide an opportunity for experiment with new
types of programs, and (5) they provide programs which satisfy
"significant minority tastes." 89
Local Live Programs-In the Bluebook, the Commission an-
nounced its intention of lessening the emphasis it had formerly placed
on the carrying of local live programs,90 i.e., local programs which
feature live talent exclusively, whether originating in the station's
studios or by remote control.' As reasons for its change of heart,
the FCC assigned the "development of network, transcription, and
wire news services." 92 The Commission, however, did not divest
itself of all right to consider "local" programming as a factor in
measuring a station's service in the public interest--"Nevertheless,
reasonable provision for local self-expression still remains an essential
function of a station's operation . . . . ,,
84 THE BLUEBOOK 55 (1946).
85 With some slight variation, the format for the remaining part of this
discussion of programming in the public interest will follow closely the outline
used in the Bluebook.
86 A commercial program is ... any program the time for which is paid
for by a sponsor or any program which is interrupted by a spot announce-
ment ... at intervals of less than 14/ minutes." FCC PUBLIc NoricE 95462
(July 2, 1946).8 7 THE BLUEBOOK 12 (1946).
88 "A sustaining program.., is any program which is neither paid for by
a sponsor nor interrupted by a spot announcement ... " FCC PUBLic Nonc
95462, p. 2 (July 2, 1946).
89 See note 87 supra.90 THE BLUEBOK 56 (1946).
91 FCC PuBLIc NoTicE 95462, p. 2 (July 2, 1946).
92 See note 90 supra.
93 Ibid.
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Advertising Practices-While recognizing that advertisers sus-
tain radio, the Commission points out that radio is not the exclusive
property of the commercial sponsor, and that his interest must be
subordinated to the interest of the general public. Accordingly, the
FCC has announced that as a condition precedent to the grant of a
station license, the applicant will be required to state how much time
he has devoted or proposes to devote to advertising matter in any
one hour.
94
Programs devoted to the discussion of public issues-As previ-
ously noted, the Communications Act requires that broadcasters afford
equal opportunities to all candidates for a given political office. 95 In
addition, Commission rules require that broadcasters afford equal
opportunities for discussion of controversial issues.96 The question
arises: What is a controversial issue? An interesting example of
the complexity which this problem can attain is presented by the case
of In re Scott.97 Scott, a west-coast atheist, had petitioned the Com-
mission to revoke the licenses of three California radio stations. He
charged that the defendant stations had refused to make time avail-
able to him, by sale or otherwise, for the purpose of broadcasting talks
advocating atheism. On the other hand, he alleged, they had permit-
ted the use of their stations for direct arguments against atheism, as
well as for indirect arguments (church services, prayers, Bible read-
ings, etc.). He contended that the existence or non-existence of a
Divine Being was a "controversial issue," and that in refusing to allo-
cate time for arguments in support of atheism, the defendant stations
were not presenting all sides of the issue, and therefore were not
operating in the public interest.
The Commission concluded that Scott was entirely correct in his
complaint, but hastened to add that since practically every station in
the country was also "guilty" of the same charge, the petition would
have to be denied--". . . to do otherwise," the Commission asserted,
cc.. would be to necessitate the revocation of too many licenses." 98
In a later case, arising on facts substantially the same, the Commission
ventured even farther. Mr. Arthur Cromwell, president of the
Rochester Society of Freethinkers and father of Vashti McCollum,
demanded that Station WHAM (Rochester, New York) give him
time to answer a religious broadcast made over its facilities by a
Catholic priest. WHAM declined, and Cromwell complained to the
Commission. The FCC entertained his complaint, when WHAM's
license came up for renewal in May, 1948. At that time, the Com-
missioners voted 3 to 2 against granting the station's application for
a 3-year renewal, and compromised on a temporary renewal to Sep-
94 Ibid.
95 See note 62 supra.
98 See WARNuqR, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 393 (1948).
97 11 F. C. C. 372 (1946).
98 Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 232, 248, n. 99 (1950).
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tember 1, pending further study. 9 The Commission's dicta in the
Scott case and its preliminary decision in the WHAM case have been
the object of much serious criticism,100 and some humorous specula-
tion as to just what is a "controversial issue."
One member of Congress ... pointed out that this was the same as demanding
that a radio station give time to a criminal to reply on the air every time
"Mr. District Attorney" or "The Crime Busters" programs were broadcast.
Another Congressman... likened the decision to the fantastic state of affairs
that would exist if radio stations had to allow time to persons who do not be-
lieve in medicine and doctors whenever a public health officer took to the air
to instruct citizens in the care and prevention of disease. Are vegetarians
entitled to reply to radio programs featuring toothsome recipes for cooking
meat and poultry? Maybe there are even some sincere believers in opium
eating or polygamy who might be entitled to "have their say" under such a
doctrine.101
Another facet of the Commission's practice relative to station
programming was brought into focus by the famed Mayflower de-
cision.1 02 Station WAAB of Boston had from time to time, broad-
cast the editorial views of its owners. On application for renewal
of its license, the Commission condemned this practice, saying:
A truly free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the licensee. It
cannot be used to support the candidacies of his friends. It cannot be devoted
to the support of principles he happens to regard most favorably. In brief,
the broadcaster cannot be an advocate1 o3
As in the Scott case, the Commission was speaking only dictum
and after the applicant had submitted affidavits to the effect that the
station would refrain from further "editorializing," the license was
renewed. But broadcasters take notice of what the FCC says as
well as what it does, and for nearly eight years thereafter, that dictum
stood as a barrier to the licensee's use of his microphone for opinion-
ated self-expression.10 4 It was not until June, 1949, after hearings
requested by the National Association of Broadcasters, that the Com-
mission modified its prohibition against "editorializing" and concluded
that such is permissible if a station's broadcasting policies meet the
test of overall fairness.'0 5
o99The case is discussed in an article by Edward J. Heffron in the July,
1948 issue of Columbia magazine. The article, entitled, Atheism Bids for a
Place on the Air, is reprinted in full in 94 CONG. RFc. A5018 (1948) as part
of the extension of remarks by the Hon. Charles J. Kersten in the House of
Representatives.
100 Ibid.; the writer in the Virginia Law Review refers to the dictum in the
Scott case as, ..... the monstrosity known as the Scott case doctrine." Note,
36 VA. L. REv. 232, 248 (1950).
101 Harness, The FCC Still Needs Investigation, 42 P. U. FoRT. 835, 840
(1948).
102 Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F. C. C. 333 (1941).
103 Id. at 340.
104 See WA xm, op. cit. supra note 96, at 394.
205 FCC REPORT oN EDITORTALIZiNG (1949).
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Community Need
Inexorably interwoven with almost every facet of the public in-
terest concept is the issue of community need for the proposed broad-
cast service. Thus, this element is an ingredient in the determination
of financial 10 and technical 107 qualification; and even weighs as a
factor in the evaluation of an applicant's proposed program service.'0 8
Yet, the determination of need is a difficult process, not readily sus-
ceptible to the application of fixed standards, 0 9 and hence, Commis-
sion policy in this respect cannot be easily ascertained. Certain threads
of decision principle can, however, be discerned in the pattern of
past Commission practice; and, it is these which are offered for
consideration.
As noted earlier, an applicant for a broadcast permit is generally
required to evidence the commercial feasibility of the proposed under-
taking.110  In establishing this premise, a petitioner may frequently
present evidence of community need for an advertising outlet to
serve the needs of local retailers and producers."' To do so, he may
show that at present, the locale in which he proposes to operate is
without primary service," 2 or that the service, presently offered, is
inadequate." 3 He may evidence the acceptability of his proposals
to the residents of the community "1 4 and establish that its merchants
have agreed to utilize his facilities for sales promotion.1 5 Of course,
his assertions are subject to attack by owners of existing facilities
whose economic interest would be adversely affected by the addition
106 See Re McConnell, 6 F. C. C. 167, 169 (1938) ; Re Packard, 4 F. C. C.
288, 290 (1937).
107 See Re Press-Union Publishing Co., 7 F. C. C. 7 (1939); Re Tribune
Printing Co., 6 F. C. C. 332 (1938).
108 See Re Missouri Broadcasting Co., 3 F. C. C. 349 (1936).
109 "The determination of need is a subjective process. There is no yard-
stick which can be applied against any given set of statistics with the invariable
result that the need for another broadcast station is or is not demonstrated.
The best the Commission can do is to receive such testimony as is offered
and announce its opinion as to the need. The opinion may be dignified by
calling it a conclusion or a finding of fact, but nevertheless it remains an opin-
ion, a kind of enlightened and informed guess." Re Roderick, 3 F. C. C. 616,
623 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
110 See note 52 supra.
111 See note 115 infra.
112 See Re Atwood, 7 F. C. C. 72 (1939) ; Re Galesburg Broadcasting Co.,
5 F. C. C. 64 (1938); Re Patrick, 5 F. C. C. 48 (1937).
113 See note 77 supra.
114 "The Commission's Rules and its policy and practice contemplate a recep-
tive consideration of the testimony of members of the public upon matters
pertinent to the issue in proceedings of the nature wherein the public interest
criterion is so predominant. Interested citizens who file protests or endorse-
ments of pending proposals . . . may express by public testimony upon the
record their relevant views upon the matter at issue." Re Kansas City Broad-
casting Co., FCC Docx=r No. 8415, FCC 50D-63, p. 55 (December 29, 1950).
115 See Re Emporia Broadcasting Co., 6 F. C. C. 524 (1938) ; Re Hedrick,
6 F. C. C. 79 (1938).
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of new facilities.'1 6 Opposition to the entrance of the applicant new-
comer may also be grounded on an assertion that the proposed trans-
mission will result in electrical interference with present operations." 7
Other Qualifications
In addition to the foregoing specified categories of licensee quali-
fication, the Commission has asserted its right to consider miscel-
laneous factors of eligibility, which can be grouped together under
the general heading of "Other Qualifications." These will be dis-
cussed in brief.
Character: Section 308 of the Communications Act empowers
the Commission to investigate the character of the applicant in de-
termining his qualifications for a radio broadcast license."18 In
Mester v. United States,"19 this power was explained to include the
right to examine every facet of an applicant's personality-his be-
havior, integrity, temperament, consideration, sportsmanship, altru-
ism, etc. 20 In that case, the Commission had refused to consent
to a transfer of stock which would give substantial ownership and
control of a radio broadcast station to proposed transferees, who had
had previous difficulties with government agencies as to weight-
shortages, price-ceiling violations, fraudulent advertising, etc. And,
in another case, the communications mentors denied permits to a
newspaper for the construction of AM and FM outlets in Mansfield,
Ohio, on the ground that the applicant's activities as a publisher had
indicated marked propensities for monopolistic practices. 1 1 Yet,
in still another case, the Commission granted a license despite the
fact that the applicant had been a frequent violator of local liquor
and gambling control laws. 2 2 The dearth of cases dealing with this
precise facet of FCC licensing practice makes it difficult-indeed,
impossible-to discern any pattern of decision which will serve as an
accurate indicator of Commission policy in this respect.
Personal Ability: As evidenced in the Kansas City decision,'23
the Commission will not hesitate to pierce the corporate veil and
216 See Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio Sta-
tion, 309 U. S. 470, 476 (1940). But cf. Sunshine Broadcasting Co. v. Fly,
33 F. Supp. 560 (D. D. C. 1940).
117Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319
U. S. 239 (1943). Accord, Wilson v. Federal Communications Commission,
170 F. 2d 793 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
11s48 STAT. 1084 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 308(b) (1946).
170 F. Supp. 118 (E. D. N. Y.), aff'd, 332 U. S. 749 (1947). Accord,
Calumet Broadcasting Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 160 F.
2d 285 (D. C. Cir. 1947).
120 Mester v. United States, supra note 119, at 122.2 1 Mansfield Journal Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 180 F. 2d
28 (D. C. Cir. 1950). The case is noted in 50 COL. L. REv. 849 (1950) ; 59
YALE L. J. 1342 (1950).
122 Re Jones, 11 F. C. C. 1138 (1947).123 Re Kansas City Broadcasting Co., FCC DocKw No. 8415, FCC 5OD-63
(December 29, 1950).
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examine the personal qualifications of applicants who petition in cor-
porate garb. 24 Assuming the validity of this procedure, the question
arises: what elements of personal ability should or does the Com-
mission consider pertinent in passing on an application for broadcast
facilities ?
In the Kansas City case, the ruling turned on the lack of business
acumen displayed by the officers of the corporate applicant. Although
the business prowess of the petitioner and his employees has been
considered as an element in several cases,125 this decision would seem
to be the only one which turns solely on that point.126
Another element of personal ability considered by the agency
is the applicant's familiarity with the technical aspects of radio
broadcasting.127  It is not necessary that he personally have a com-
plete understanding of the mechanical operation of broadcast equip-
ment, but it is required that he staff his station with mechanically
competent personnel.128 With the ready supply of war-trained trans-
mission technicians now available on the labor market, this require-
ment would seem to present no formidable barrier to the acquisition
of a radio broadcast permit.12 9
Purpose: By implication, Section 319 of the Communications
Act requires that in passing on an application, the Commission de-
termine that the purpose for which it is planned to use the proposed
station will serve the public interest.'8 0 The Reorganized Church
case 131 presents an interesting application of this rule. There, the
petitioner had stated as one of the purposes for which it planned to
use the proposed facilities, the propagation and fostering of its own
religious beliefs. Partially on this ground, the application was de-
nied, the examiner expressing the opinion that the powers of the
Commission, as an arm of the Federal Government, could not be
exercised to find that the public interest would be served by licensing
an applicant for such purpose.13 2  The reasoning of the examiner
224 Id. at 55. "The Kansas City corporate applicant must necessarily be con-
sidered as possessing those qualifications and attributes, favorable and unfavor-
able, which are exhibited by its president . ..."125 See Re Joseph Henry Broadcasting Co., 12 F. C. C. 313, 337 (1947) (no
experience with broadcasting) ; Re Delehanty, 11 F C C 1178 1194 (1947);
Re Fall River Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 398, 399 (1941) (application
granted when it appeared licensees would hire "experienced executive of rec-
ognized ability").
128 The ruling may be justified on the ground that a financial failure by one
licensee may discourage future attempts by others, with a consequent loss of
service to the community involved.
127 Re Weil, 5 F. C. C. 369 (1938) ; Re Pierce, 3 F. C. C. 146 (1936).
128Re Kindig, 3 F. C. C. 313 (1936).
129 More than 400,000 persons are generally employed for the operation of
radio transmitters in the United States. There are more than 700,000 author-
ized operators. 16 FCC ANIx. REP. 125-126 (1950).
13048 STAT. 1089 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §319 (1946).
13,Re Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, FCC
DocET No. 8870, FCC 50D-63 (December 29, 1950).
132 U. S. CoxsT. AmEND. I; FCC 50D-63, pp. 68-69 (December 29, 1950).
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in this respect appears to be sound.' 3s Moreover, the decision is con-
sistent with the Commission's duty to secure a fair and equitable
distribution of available radio frequencies, 3 4 and with its policy of
rejecting applications for stations proposed to be operated exclusively
in the interests of individuals or groups. 1
3 5
Summary and Appraisal
The end and aim of this writing as outlined in the general intro-
duction was threefold: (1) to examine the law which has governed
radio broadcasting; (2) to evaluate it; and (3) to consider the merit
of extending its application to television broadcasting. The particular
task of this segment of the overall assignment was the examination
and appraisal of the public interest concept as applied by the Com-
munications Commission in the licensing of radio services.
The record, as revealed by the antecedent review of Commission
rulings and court determinations, discloses that on the whole, the
administration of our radio law, in this respect, has not been too
objectionable. True, the Commission has occasionally left itself open
to severe and justifiable criticism by its rulings in particular cases,
such as the Scott and Heitmeyer decisions. But while these 'errors
in judgment have been glaring, it is also true that they have been
comparatively infrequent. The only substantial indictment which
can be made against the Commission is its failure to have enunciated
and followed a clear and consistent licensing policy. It is true that
maximum efficiency in administrative regulation requires a policy
flexible enough to adapt itself to the exigencies of changing condi-
tions. But fairness demands that applicants and licensees have a
guide to which they can look with a degree of certainty when plotting
a course of conduct. The Bluebook was-in this respect, at least-
a forward step.
133 The reasoning of the examiner was as follows:
1. Before issuing a license to any applicant, the Commission must affirma-
tively find that the purpose for which such license will be used, is in the public
interest.
2. This applicant proposes to utilize the proposed station for the propa-
gation of its religious beliefs.
3. Therefore, in order to grant this license, the Commission would have
to find the propagation of petitioner's faith would be in the public interest.
4. But the Constitution prohibits the Commission from either approving
or disapproving of petitioner's religious beliefs.
5. Therefore, the Commission cannot affirmatively find that the proposed
station will serve public interest, and the application must be denied.
But cf. Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 105 F. 2d 793, 795 (D. C. Cir. 1939): "The public interest does not
necessarily demand that all stations become commercial, or that none be sup-
ported by religious bodies."
131 See 4S STAT. 1083 (1934), as amended, 49 STAT. 1475 (1936), 47 U. S. C.
§ 307(b) (1946).
235 See Caldwell, Legal Restrictions on the Contents of Broadcast Programs,
9 Am L. R'v. 229, 240 (1938).
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The law under which the Commission functions, however, should
be the subject of some serious congressional reflection. 3 6 The broad
licensing powers with which the Commission has been endowed,
present grave potentialities for misuse-potentialities which, it is
submitted, make undesirable the "as is" continuance of the present
law, and especially its extended application to television broadcasting.
Particularly is this true with respect to the Commission-assumed and
court-confirmed power to regulate the programming practices of
broadcast licensees.
The rising importance of television as a vehicle of thought ex-
pression must of necessity be accompanied by a comparative decline
in the importance of other mediums of communication. It must be
understood that all media of mass communication-the newspaper,
radio and TV--depend for their existence and support on the adver-
tising dollar. In the future, more and more of these dollars are
going to be spent for television advertising, as opposed to radio and
newspaper promotion. The reason, of course, is obvious. Tele-
vision presents to the advertiser for the first time, an opportunity
to "show and tell" his message to the buying public. For many types
of advertising, therefore, TV will become the dominant, if not the
exclusive, medium. The withdrawal of this major advertising support
will inevitably effect the economic collapse of many radio and news-
paper services. 187 The failure or replacement of radio stations will,
for the most part, affect only the economic interests of those who
operate them. The loss of a substantial number of newspapers will
be more serious.
The Commission's ability to regulate thought expression by
administrative suggestion has made it impossible for radio to function
as an unfettered vehicle for thought transmission. Until now, the
newspapers of the country have served to offset and neutralize the
potentiality and effect of this "regulation by raised eyebrow." 138
They will continue to do for some time to come. But as inevitably
many newspapers collapse before the economic pressure of television's
increased use, the political sway of the printed word will decline in
importance. It is imperative, therefore, that the medium which sup-
plants the press as the prime mover of public opinion function with
essentially the same freedom from government control which news-
papers, themselves, have enjoyed.
True, the limited facilities available for video transmission re-
quire that some regulations be imposed upon it which are unnecessary
136 Occasionally the national legislators do worry about the present state of
our radio controls. But their apprehension is usually in connection with the
activities of the FCC, rather than with the law under which it functions.
See 94 CoNG. REc. 9227 (1948).
137 See Smith, Television: There Ought to be a Law, 1180 HARiEs 34(Sept. 1948).
188 The phrase was coined by former FCC Chairman, James L. Fly. See
Harness, The FCC Still Needs Investigation, 42 P. U. FORT. 835, 839 (1948).
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in newspaper publication, but the Congress, and not the Commission,
should assume the task of framing them. The substitution of ad-
ministrative fiat for well-defined legislation can no longer be tolerated
in the realm of communication control. Legislation-clear-cut legis-
lation-defining the rights and duties of broadcasters, should be en-
acted now. Only thus can we obviate the dangers inherent in our
present system of radio service licensing.
Part II
GOVERNMENTAL CENSORSHIP OF TELEVISION BROADCASTING
Not too many years ago, American music listeners were concern-
ing themselves with the lyrical difficulties of a mythical hybrid named
Alexander. The lyrics described his parentage as "half-Swan" and
"half-Goose," and after several bars of mixed beat concluded that
Alexander was a "Swoose." Recently, the federal courts in the case
of Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. Carroll 1 were presented
with a similar problem-the problem of ascertaining the nature of
motion picture film transmitted over radio ether waves. But the
problem they faced was not so easy of solution as that which con-
fronted Alexander's musical creator. For theirs was the necessary
choice between two systems of law-motion picture law and radio
law-and their determination was to have far-reaching effects on
the legal future of visual broadcasting.
The "Dumont" Case
Five federally licensed Pennsylvania television stations brought
an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of a
regulation promulgated by the Pennsylvania State Board of Censors
requiring all motion picture film intended to be broadcast by tele-
vision in Pennsylvania 2 to be submitted to the Board for censorship
186 F. Supp. 813 (E. D. Pa. 1949), aff'd, 184 F. 2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 490 (1951).
2 The use of film in television programming is extensive. Of all the broad-
casting conducted by the television stations of the United States at least 25%
consists of film projection. More film is used in television than in the motion
picture industry. This results from the greater number of programs shown
over a television station as compared with a motion picture theatre and also
because a television film program is generally given but once over any par-
ticular station in contrast with the frequent showings, sometimes "long runs,"
of the same motion picture in a theatre.
Film is used in television in various ways. An entire program may be
broadcast from film. Action and sound recorded on film prior to broadcast
may be integrated into an otherwise live program. Film may be employed as
background during live programs. Commercial announcements are frequently
recorded on films. By the process known as "kinescope recording" or "tele-
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purposes.5 The district court concluded that the regulation was
invalid because it impinged a field of interstate commerce which
Congress had pre-empted under the Radio Act of 19274 and the
Federal Communications Act of 1934,' and that the regulation was
inconsistent with the national policy adopted by Congress for the
regulation and control of radio and television. Briefly, the rationale
of the court's decision was that there had been a complete occupation
of the field by the Federal Government. The district court also
concluded (1) that the regulation was invalid as constituting an
undue and unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in television
broadcasting, 6 and (2) that the regulation was violative of the First
and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution as an
infringement of the freedoms of speech and the press.7 The case
was the first in which the courts have discussed the question of gov-
ernmental censorship rights over television broadcasts.
A discussion of this aspect of censorship may best be developed
by an inqury into the three grounds of attack propounded by the
broadcasters in their briefs and sustained by the district court, viz.,
(1) that Pennsylvania's attempt to censor any part of television broad-
casting was invalid because it conflicted with federal legislation and
because the State was asserting its regulatory power within a field
transcription" live programs frequently are recorded on film at the time of
their production to the end that the film can be used for broadcasts of the
programs. By a technique known as "bicycling," a single print of a film may
be used successively at different stations.
s The complete text of the regulation reads as follows:
"13 Miscellaneous Provisions
"(d) Projection of motion pictures by television. All motion picture films,
reels or views intended for projection or broadcast by television in Pennsyl-
vania must first be submitted by the exchange, owner or lessee of the film,
reel, or view for censorship purposes, and must not be projected by television
in Pennsylvania unless first a pproved by the Board and a seal issued therefor
upon payment of the proper fee, and said proper approval seal displayed upon
every showing."
The regulation was issued under authority of a 1915 Pennsylvania statute,
P. L. 534, as amended, PuRDON's PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 4, §§ 41-58 (1941).
Section 42 of the Act provides: "It shall be unlawful to sell, lease, lend,
exhibit, or use any motion-picture film, reel, or view, in Pennsylvania, unless
the said film, reel, or view, has been submitted . . . and duly approved by the
Pennsylvania State Board of Censors.. . " Section 43 of the Act provides:
"The board shall examine ... all films, reels, or views to be exhibited or used
in Pennsylvania; and shall approve such films, reels, or views which are moral
and proper; and shall disapprove such as are sacrilegious, obscene, indecent
or immoral, or such as tend, in the judgment of the board, to debase or corrupt
morals. This section shall not apply to announcement or advertising slides or
to films or reels containing current news events or happenings . . . which are
not in violation of the provisions of this section."
444 STAT. 1162-1174 (1927).
5 48 STAT. 1064-1105 (1934), as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-609 (Supp.
1950).6:The Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, did not pass on this point.
7 The conclusion of law in respect to this latter point was not mentioned
in the decision of the district court.
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fully occupied by the Congress; (2) that the regulation imposed an
undue and unreasonable burden on interstate commerce; and (3) that
the regulation infringed the freedoms of speech and press guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Occupation of the Field by the Federal Government
A. The Scope of the Federal Communications Act of 1934
There is no doubt that radio broadcasting is in interstate com-
merce.8  Congress, therefore, pursuant to the Commerce Clause,9
has the power to regulate communication by radio, and radio broad-
casting in particular.'0 This was done through the enactment of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934. The question then arose
as to the applicability of the Act to television. Nowhere within the
Act is the word "television" mentioned, but today there is little
doubt that the provisions of the Act clearly extend to visual as well
as to aural radio transmission." Section 3(b) of the Act states the
following comprehensive definition of radio communication:
"Radio communication" or "communication by radio" means the transmis-
sion by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by
aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the points of origin and
reception of such transmission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, ap-
paratus, and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery
of communications) incidental to such transmission.' 2
8 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond and Mortgage
Company (Station WIBU), 289 U. S. 266 (1934); Technical Radio Labora-
tory v. Federal Radio Commission, 36 F. 2d 111 (D. C. Cir. 1929); General
Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Commission 31 F. 2d 630 (D. C. Cir. 1929).
O U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."
18 For a summary of the history of federal regulation of radio communi-
cation see National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190(19435. See also WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISiON LAW 757 et seq. (1948).
11 REPORT OF THE SENATE CoMMITEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, SEN.
REP'. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), discussing Senate Bill S. 3285,
which later was enacted as the Federal Communications Act stated: "The
purpose of this bill is to create a communication commission with regulatory
power over all forms of electrical communication. . . ." (Italics supplied.)
See also REPORT OF THE HousE COMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMcE, H. R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); Oppenheim,
Legal Aspects of Television, 8 Am L. REv. 13, 26 (1937).
1248 STAT. 1065 (1934), as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. §153(b) (Supp.
1950). Section 2 of the Act, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U. S.
C. A. § 152(a) (Supp. 1950), provides: "The provisions of this Act shall
apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio and all
interstate and foreign transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or
is received within the United States, and to all persons engaged within the
United States in such communication or such transmission of energy by radio,
and to the licensing and regulating of all radio stations as hereinafter pro-
vided. . . ." Section 301 of the Act, 48 STAT. 1081 (1934), as amended, 47
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Since 1929 the Federal Radio Commission and its successor, the
Federal Communications Commission, have exercised broad juris-
diction over the development of telecasting and reported the exercise
of such jurisdiction to Congress. For example, in 1929 the Federal
Radio Commission reported the reservation of certain frequencies
for experimental work in visual broadcasting and reported that cer-
tain technical information had been obtained as a result of experi-
mental work in the field.13 As expressed by the broadcasters in the
Dumont case, "The long acquiescence of the Congress in the exercise
of this jurisdiction" would appear to dispel "any doubt that it is
proper." 14
Recognizing the Commission's jurisdiction over television broad-
casting, the question now presented is: how extensive and how ex-
clusive is this authority in respect to the regulation of program con-
tent? Has there been a complete occupation of the field by the fed-
eral government? The Board of Censors in the Dumont case con-
tended that Congress did not occupy the field of censorship of tele-
vision programs but merely regulated radio with a view to achieving
the maximum utilization of radio facilities and assuring that such
facilities would not be monopolized by some to the exclusion of others.
But the Board relied primarily, as a basis for argument, on an inter-
pretation of Section 326 of the Federal Communications Act. Section
326 of the Act reads as follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Com-
mission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right
of free speech by means of radio communication.15
Does Section 326 exclude any possibility of a right in the federal
government to regulate censorship of television programs? The
Board argued that Congress in Section 326 was limiting only the
powers of the Commission and did not attempt to preclude a state
from censoring radio communication. The Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit, rejecting this contention, pointed out that Section 326 was
not intended to give the states censorship rights specifically denied
to the federal agency.' 6 The court stated: "The Act itself demon-
U. S. C. A. § 301 (Supp. 1950), provides: "It is the purpose of this Act,
among other things, to maintain the control of the United States over all the
channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the
use of such channels .. .by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses
granted by Federal authority....
13 3 FRC ANN. REP. 28 (1929). For supervision over experiments in color
television, see I PIKE & FIscHmR RADio RFG. 91:261, 91:441 (1950).
14 Brief for Appellees, p. 12, Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. Carroll,
184 F. 2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950).
1548 STAT. 1091 (1934), as amended, 62 STAT. 862 (1948), 47 U. S. C. A.
§326 (Supp. 1950).
16 Query: does it follow that the states were therefore denied those rights?
Might those rights have been inherent in the states? See note 25 infra.
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strates that Congress was vitally concerned with the nature of the
programs broadcast as affecting the public good. It, therefore, dealt
directly with the subject matter of the broadcasts .... Congress thus
set up a species of 'program control' far . . .more effective than the
antique method of censorship which Pennsylvania endeavors to ef-
fectuate in the instant case." 17 Exemplary of this system of "program
control"'-a system of self-regulation-are the provisions of the Com-
munications Act: (1) providing for a careful check by the Commis-
sion as to the character and responsibility of any person seeking to
obtain a license to operate a broadcasting station; 18 (2) prohibiting
the assignment or transfer of a license without the written consent
of the Commission after it has secured full information respecting the
responsibility of the assignee or transferee; 19 (3) authorizing the
Commission to suspend the license of any operator upon proof that
the licensee ".. . has transmitted... communications containing pro-
fane or obscene words, language, or meaning. ; 20 and (4) dealing
with applications for renewal of licenses. 21
The question of when the exercise by Congress of a lawfully
delegated power precludes action by a state government in the same
or closely related fields is a perplexing one, and one that has frequently
been considered by the courts.22  From these cases has evolved the
principle that even in a field traditionally occupied by the states, the
power of the states to act will be deemed to have been superseded by
a federal act where such was the "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Would it be reasonable to say that the tenuous "occupa-
tion of the field" doctrine-the rationale of the decision in the Dunont
case-was a sound basis for the decision? Or stated differently, was
it the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" that the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 supersede all power of the states to
act in respect to the censorship of program content? The answer
would appear to be in the negative. To say, as did the court of
appeals, that to prohibit a power to a federal agency is to prohibit
it to the states is a somewhat unique principle, lacking substantial, if
any, foundation. Nowhere is the control of the Commission over
television broadcasting expressly made exclusive. If the purpose of
17 Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. Carroll, 184 F. 2d 153, 156 (3d
Cir. 1950).
1848 STAT. 1034 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 308 1b (1946).
10 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 310b (1946).
2048 STAT. 1032 (1934), as amended, 50 STAT. 190 (1937), 47 U S. C.§303 (m) (D) (1946). Section 1464 of the new Title 18 U. S. C. A., "Crimes
and Criminal Procedure," reads as followvs: "Section 1464 Broadcasting Ob-
scene! Language Whoever utters any obscene, indecent or profane language
by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U. S. C. A. § 1464 (1948).
2148 STAT. 1085 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 309 (1946).2 2 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947) ; Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761 (1945) ; Cloverleaf Butter Co.
v. Patterson, 315 U S. 143 (1942); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941);
Charleston & XV. C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597 (1915).
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Congress was to rule out any state censorship whatsoever, Congress
might well have unequivocally so declared. The "occupation" doc-
trine would appear to be inapplicable in the instant case.28
Burden on Interstate Commerce
"There is a recognized principle . . . that may be taken as a
postulate for testing whether particular state legislation in the absence
of action by Congress is beyond state power. This is that the state
legislation is invalid if it unduly burdens . . . commerce in matters
where uniformity is necessary-necessary in the constituted sense of
useful in accomplishing a permitted purpose." 24 There is no doubt
that television is in interstate commerce.2 5 Was, then, the matter
attempted to be regulated by the Pennsylvania Board of Censors com-
merce such as requires uniform regulation?
Time is an important factor in the production of television pro-
grams. The outstanding appeal of television to the advertiser (upon
23 For an able discussion of governmental regulation of the program con-
tent of television broadcasting, see Note, 19 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 312 (1951).
Therein the author notes-and it would appear that the point is well taken-
that nowhere in the Dumont case was Section 414 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act raised. The section reads: "Nothing in this Act contained shall in
any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies."
The author states in respect to Section 414: "At first blush, it might seem
that Congress thereby intended to pre-empt the entire field of communication
except for a limited number of specifically indicated exceptions, viz., '... . rem-
edies now existing at common law or by statute....' But what are these rem-
edies if not the entire body of law encompassed in the private rights under the
common law and the public rights reserved to the States under the Constitution?
The word 'remedies' is not to be given a restricted meaning: it refers not only
to the enforcement of private rights, but also to the enforcement of public
rights . . . not only to redress and compensation for violation of those rights,
but also to the prevention of violations. There is no federal common law.
The administration of the common law is to be found in the courts established
by the state governments, and in the federal courts applying substantive state
law. The states may abolish or modify rights existing under the common law
where such action constitutes a reasonable exercise of its police or other regu-
latory powers. Thus the section must refer to nothing less than the totality
of reserved powers. Nor is the phrase 'now existing' to be given a narrow
interpretation. It cannot be contemplated that Congress thereby sought to
ossify completely the existing state public and private law relating to radio
communication. Rather, the import of the section is that the full range of
activity for the exercise of state powers is to remain unimpaired, neither aug-
mented nor restricted. . . . Careful consideration of this section thus impels
the conclusion that what was contemplated was not an occupation of the field,
but concurrent jurisdiction over those aspects of the field not otherise denied
to the states." Id. at 322-3.
24 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 377-8 (1946).
25 Television programs broadcast in Pennsylvania are received by persons
possessing television sets not only in Pennsylvania but also, depending upon the
location and power of the broadcasting station, in Delaware, Maryland, New
Jersey, New York, West Virginia and Ohio. There is no way to confine tele-
vision broadcasts to receipt only by persons of the state in which the trans-
mitting station is located.
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whom the industry largely depends for economic support) grows
out of the effects of immediacy, spontaneity, and flexibility in pro-
gramming. It is the practice, therefore, of television broadcasters
and advertisers to prepare programs, frequently on film, as close to
the time of broadcast as possible in order to take full advantage of
the opportunity to have the program "up to the minute." The Penn-
sylvania regulation would undoubtedly require the rental of films for
a longer period of time in order to afford the Board of Censors an
opportunity to review the same.26 In addition, enforcement of such
censorship would have the effect of imposing the standards of the
Pennsylvania Board of Censors upon the people of neighboring
states. It is doubtful that all states establishing regulations similar
to the regulation involved in the Dumont case would have identical
censorship standards.27 If each state making use of film for program-
ming, or receiving film programs from other states, may censor the
material transmitted, censorship would extend beyond state boundar-
ies. The state maintaining the most rigid censorship standards would
determine the norm of censorship standards to be adhered to by all
the other states. To require a network to submit its program content
for censorship purposes to any state through which the program will
be relayed would appear to be an unreasonable burden. The burden
upon commerce would be one resulting not merely from a regulation
proposed by one state, as in the Dumont case, but from potential
regulation by every state in the Union. The conclusion seems inevi-
table that the matter sought to be regulated by the Board of Censors
in the Dumont case was such as requires uniformity of regulation,
and hence, that the Pennsylvania regulation was invalid as constituting
an undue burden on interstate commerce. It is submitted that the
"restraint of commerce" argument is the proper basis for the decision
in the Dumont case.
Freedom of Speech and Press
Recognizing state censorship of film intended for television broad-
cast to be invalid as constituting an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce, the problem remains to be determined: is the matter sub-
ject to any censorship? The broadcasters contended that the regula-
tion was an infringement upon constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and the press. Both the district court and the court of
26 The broadcasters in the Dumont case argued that the increase in the cost
of operation of each television station would be increased beyond its revenue
potential. The Supreme Court gave little acknowledgment to an argument
based on economic hardship in Mutual Film Corp. v. Hodges, 236 U. S. 248(1915). However, in view of the infant state of the television industry, per-
haps some weight should be given to the economic hardship aspect. See
Bergson, State Censorship of Television, 19 FED. B. J. 151, 155 (1949).
27 See Luraschi, Censorship at Home and Abroad, 254 ANALS 147, 148-9(1947), detailing the varying standards to which the motion picture industry
must conform in order to meet the standards of different censors.
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appeals avoided discussion of this constitutional issue.2 8  A brief
survey of the law of censorship in respect to the motion picture in-
dustry and the radio industry would seem pertinent in view of the
analogy of film intended for television broadcast to both motion pic-
tures exhibited in a theatre and radio broadcasting.
At the present time, censorship of motion pictures by official
state boards is authorized by statute in six states.29 Such statutes
have been sustained as constitutional in the case of Mutual Film
Corp. v. Industrial Commission.8" Although the case has been the
subject of much adverse criticism, s l the federal courts as late as
1950 32 have sustained the holding. The Court stated in the Mutual
28The tendency to avoid decision on such a constitutional issue is not
without respectable authority to substantiate it. The Supreme Court said in
Parker v. Los Angeles, 338 U. S. 327, 333 (1949), "The best teaching of the
Court's experience admonishes us not to entertain constitutional questions in
advance of the strictest necessity." See also United Artists Corp. v. Board
of Censors, 189 Term. 397, 225 S. W. 2d 550, cert. denied, 339 U. S. 952 (1950),
where the Memphis Board of Censors banned "Curley," an "Our Gang" type
of picture, upon the ground that the south does not permit Negroes in white
schools "nor recognize social equality between the races even in children."
The picture showed white and colored children attending school and playing
together. The case was dismissed on the ground that the distributor had no
standing to bring the cause of action.29 Kansas (1913), Maryland (1916), New York (1921), Ohio (1913),
Pennsylvania (1911) and Virginia (1922). Massachusetts censors films shown
on Sunday (which would encompass practically all films). Connecticut's stat-
ute was repealed; Florida held such a statute unconstitutional; and Louisiana's
statute has never been given effect.30236 U. S. 230 (1915). The case involved an Ohio statute which estab-
lished a censorship board whose duty it was to examine and censor motion
picture films to be publicly exhibited and displayed in Ohio, and pass and ap-
prove "only such films as are in the judgment and discretion of the board of
censors of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character. .. ."
Id. at 240. See also Mutual Film Corp. v. Hodges, 236 U. S. 248 (1915).
3" See, e.g., CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 540-8, n. 6 (1941);
CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS CoMMUNIcATIoNs 235-241 (1947); ERNST,
THE FIRST FREEDOM 182, 268 (1946); Kadin, Administrative Censorship: A
Study of the Mails, Motion Pictures and Radio Broadcasting, 19 B. U. L.
REv. 533, 548-61 (1939) ; Kupferman and O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship
-The Memphis Blues, 36 CORNEm L. Q. 288, 299 (1951) ; Note, Fiin Cen-
sorslrip: An Administrative Analysis, 39 COL. L. Rav. 1383 (1939); Note,
Censorship of Motion Pictures, 49 YALE L. J. 87, 97 (1939). It is submitted
that the adverse criticism is well founded.
32 RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 89 F. Supp. 596, aff'd, 183 F. 2d 562 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U. S. 853 (1950). The case involved the film "Lost Boun-
daries," the story of a Negro physician and his family who "passed" for white.
The Atlanta, Georgia, Board of Censors banned the picture on the ground
that "the exhibition of said picture would adversely affect the peace, morals
and good order" in that city. The picture had been shown in several southern
cities without any disorder. The denial of certiorari leaves the Mutual de-
cision as the law. A similar issue arose in respect to the picture "No Way
Out" which relates the prejudices met by a Negro physician in the practice of
his profession. A Chicago board refused a permit for the picture because it
(1) would "create unrest among the colored people," (2) did not "show a
true picturization of the white-colored situation" in Chicago, and (3) offered
no solution to the problem. A scene showing the population arming for a
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decision that "It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of
moving pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and con-
ducted for profit ... not to be regarded ... as part of the press of
the country, or as organs of public opinion." 33 The Supreme Court
subsequently, by way of obiter dicta, expressed itself to the contrary
and included motion pictures in the press category.3 4 Today it is
recognized that freedom of speech and press includes communications
which entertain 35 as well as those which inform and applies to
business activities as well.3 6 The distinction made between motion
pictures and other means of communication in terms of use or benefit
to be derived therefrom appears weak.
In the Mutual case the Court directed itself solely to the issue
of freedom of speech and the press as embodied in the Ohio Con-
stitution. The federal rights were not considered. It was "not until
1925, with the decision in Gitlow v. New York . . ." that the Court
recognized "in the Fourteenth Amendment the application to the
states of the same standards of freedom of expression as, under the
First Amendment, are applicable to the federal government." 37 It
would seem that talking pictures are within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment against state abridgment of fundamental
freedoms.3 8  If so, previous restraint by means of censorship would
be unconstitutional. It is submitted that the motion picture should
be considered and dealt with as an effective and intelligent medium
for the presentation of ideas.
In respect to radio communication and freedom of speech and
the press, a leading case is KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal
Radio Commission.9  The Court of Appeals of the District of Colum-
bia stated therein (in construing a provision of the Radio Act of 1927
race riot was deleted and the picture was then approved. This "hostile audi-
ence" argument would appear shallow as a basis for censorship.
33 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230, 244 (1915).
34 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 166 (1948).
35 Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948) (crime stories). The Court
said: "We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional pro-
tection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line be-
tween the informing and the entertaining is too illusive for the protection of
that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through
fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though
we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they
are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature."
Id. at 510.
6 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945) (solicitation of union mem-
bership).
37 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 267-8 (1941).3SThomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314
U. S. 252 (1941) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937) ; Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
3947 F. 2d 670 (D. C. Cir. 1931) (Commission refused to renew licenses
because station had transmitted matter of objectionable nature in the past).
See also Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission, 62
F. 2d 850 (D. C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 599 (1933).
19511
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
similar to Section 326 of the Federal Communications Act): "In
considering the question whether the public interest, convenience, or
necessity will be served by a renewal of appellant's license, the com-
mission has merely exercised its undoubted right to take note of
appellant's past conduct, which is not censorship." 40 No decision of
the Supreme Court has conclusively established that radio communi-
cation comes within the protection of the First Amendment. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said in National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States that ".... freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish
to use the limited facilities of radio. . . . Because it cannot be used
by all, some who wish to use it must be denied. . . . The standard
it [The Federal Communications Act of 1934] provided for the
licensing of stations was the 'public interest, convenience, or neces-
sity.' Denial of a station license on that ground, if valid under the
Act, is not a denial of free speech." 41 Section 326 of the Federal
Communications Act may have denied the Commission censorship
rights not only because Congress intended thereby to abridge the
scope of the Commission's activities, but also because Congress be-
lieved that it was not within its power to grant such rights in view
of the prohibitions of the First Amendment. It is doubtful that any
attempt by the Commission to censor portions of a proposed broad-
cast could be upheld as valid under any circumstances.
Motion picture film intended for television broadcast is analogous
to both motion pictures exhibited in a theatre and to radio communi-
cation. If deemed more akin to the former, the regulation in the
Dunont case might have been sustained on the basis of the much
criticized Mutual decision. If deemed more akin to radio, any at-
tempt at suppression by censorship would be abhorrent to our ideas
of freedom, as a restriction on the dissemination of ideas. When
recognized that film intended for television broadcast combines the
characteristics of both the motion picture and radio communication,
the conclusion that the Pennsylvania regulation would be an uncon-
stitutional infringement upon freedom of speech and the press seems
unavoidable.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the result in the Dumont case was correct.
Eliminating censorship will not ipso facto open the door to iniquity.
SoKFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F. 2d
670, 672 (D. C. Cir. 1931). This case was decided the same year as Near v.
Minwesota, szpra note 38, wherein the Supreme Court held that a state may
not enjoin a newspaper from future publication because it had in the past
printed matter which was scandalous, malicious, defamatory, or obscene. The
majority said that this amounted to censorship, a previous restraint of pub-
lication. Thus, that which is deemed censorship in the newspaper field, as
defined by Near v. Minnesota, was held by the court in the KFKB case not
to constitute censorship in the radio communication field.
41319 U. S. 190, 226-7 (1943).
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Obscenity statutes will be available. The system of "program con-
trol" now employed under the Federal Communications Act of 1934
may well prove an adequate deterrent. Various groups such as the
Legion of Decency and the National Board of Review will continue
to exercise a constant surveillance.
Part III
COLOR TELEVISION
A COMMENT ON ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
Words alone cannot fully convey the story of the tremendous
growth of the television industry and its impact upon the American
economy. Although the commercial development of the industry was
delayed until late 1946 by World War II, on January 1, 1947 there
were an estimated 15,000 television sets in the public hands. On
January 1, 1948 the number was estimated at 200,000; on January 1,
1949, at 1,000,000; on January 1, 1950, at 4,000,000; and at the pres-
ent time estimates indicate that there are nearly 12,000,000 sets in
the hands of the public. This represents an investment of nearly
$3,000,000,000, and a total television audience of 45,000,000 people.
Fortunately, this miracle of engineering, production, and market-
ing genius was spared the chaos and confusion which accompanied,
and almost ruined, the rise of its counterpart and predecessor, radio.
The Communications Act of 19341 had already provided the in-
dustry with a strong and substantial statutory system of federal regu-
lation. The basic problems of control of television had long since
been resolved and a body of substantive law and administrative rules
and procedure, administered by the Federal Communications Com-
mission, had met and solved each controversy. Now for the first
time this authority over television is challenged, and the Supreme
Court of the United States has been asked to review the regulatory
powers of the Commission over the technical development of this new
and great industry.2
In order to fully understand the nature and scope of the problem
involved it is necessary first to consider the controversial order 3 of
the Federal Communications Commission in conjunction with its
technical and historical background.
148 STAT. 1064-1105 (1934), as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-609 (Supp.
1950).2 Radio Corporation of America v. United States and Federal Communi-
cations Commission, argued before the United States Supreme Court, March
26, 1951, Docket No. 565.
3 FCC 50-1224 (Oct. 10, 1950).
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Commercial television has until the present time been carried on
under technical transmission standards established in 1941 after ex-
tensive hearings. 4 These standards were set up in order to provide
the greatest achievable performance within a six-megacycle channel.5
This single set of high quality long range standards has provided the
public with a black and white television system which has met with
widespread acceptance. These technical standards set the limits of
performance which can be achieved by existing television apparatus,
and in fact have not as yet been fully utilized, there still being room
for improvement in black and white broadcasting and reception. The
picture provided for by these standards at the present time has 525
lines and 60 fields per second, the image which appears on the re-
ceiver being comprised of approximately 200,000 picture elements. 6
This large number of picture elements accounts for the high quality
and degree of detail in the picture consequently produced.
With black and white television permanently established and the
public demand constantly growing, the skills of the industry turned
toward a still more ambitious project-color television. Accordingly,
on July 11, 1949, the Commission issued its Notice of Further Pro-
posed Rule Making.1  The Commission proposed in this notice to
consider color television systems, provided that the proposed color
systems met two basic criteria: first, that they operate in a six-
megacycle channel (the same frequency space as allotted to black
and white television systems) ; and second, that the pictures produced
could be received on existing television receivers ". . . simply by
making relatively minor modifications in such existing receivers." 8
The notice also provided that after full hearing and oral argument,
the Commission would, based on all the evidence and all available
information, adopt such rules, regulations and procedures as would
best serve the public interest, convenience, or necessity.9
During the course of the hearings three color television systems
were proposed, all of which can operate in a six-megacycle channel,
For non-technical reference purposes, they may be described as
follows: 10
(1) C.B.S. proposed a "field sequential" system employing a
single tube only, using a mechanical filter in front of the tube as a
means of producing color. The system is wholly incompatible, that
4 Report of the Commission in the Matter of Order No. 65 Setting Tele-
vision Rules and Regulations for Further Hearing, FCC DocKEr No. 5806(May 28, 1940). "Transmission standards may be simply defined as engi-
neering rules governing the characteristics of the radio signal transmitted by
the operation of radio apparatus." p. 2.
5 FCC DocKET No. 5806 (May 28, 1940).
6 FCC 50-1064 (Sept 1, 1950).
7 FCC 49-948 (July 11, 1949).
8 FCC 49-948 (July 11, 1949), as quoted in FCC 50-1064, p. 2 (Sept. 1,
1950).
9 FCC 49-948 (July 11, 1949).10 FCC 50-1064 (Sept. 1, 1950).
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is, existing receivers are unable to receive a black and white picture
from C.B.S. color transmissions. Also, due to the size of the filter,
the direct view tube is, as a practical matter, limited to 10" or 12Y4".
(2) R.C.A. proposed a "dot sequential" system which scans each
line in a series of dots rather than continuously. This system is all
electronic and completely compatible, that is, all existing receivers can
receive color T.V. transmissions of the system as a black and white
picture without making any change whatever in the receiver.
(3) C.T.I. proposed a "line sequential" system which also is
completely compatible."1
On September 1, 1950, the Commission issued its first report
setting forth detailed findings and conclusions concerning the pro-
posed color systems, 12 and setting minimum criteria which would have
to be met in order to be eligible for adoption.' 3  In this report the
Commission declined to adopt any of the proposed systems, but con-
currently suggested the adoption of "bracket standards" 14 in the ex-
"3 Inasmuch as the present controversy mainly involves the comparative
merits of the RCA and CBS systems, CTI will be eliminated from further
consideration.12 FCC 50-1064 (Sept. 1, 1950).
1. "In order for a color system to be considered eligible for adoption, it
must meet the following minimum criteria:
"a. It must be capable of operating within a 6-megacycle channel alloca-
tion structure.
"b. It must be capable of producing a color picture which has a high qual-
ity of color fidelity, has adequate apparent definition, has good picture tex-
ture, and is not marred by such defects as misregistration, line crawl,jitter or unduly prominent dot or other structure.
"c. The color picture must be sufficiently bright so as to permit an adequate
contrast range and so as to be capable of being viewed under normal home
conditions without objectionable flicker.
"d. It must be capable of operating through receiver apparatus that is
simple to operate in the home, does not have critical misregistration or
color controls, and is cheap enough in price to be available to the great
mass of the American purchasing public.
s"e. It must be capable of operating through apparatus at the station that
is technically within the competence of the type of trained personnel hired
by a station owner who does not have an extensive research or engineer-
ing staff at his disposal and the costs of purchase, operation, and main-
tenance of such equipment must not be so high as unduly to restrict the
class of persons who can afford to operate a television station.
"f. It must not be unduly susceptible to interference as compared with
the present monochrome system.
"'g. It must be capable of transmitting color programs over inter-city relay
facilities presently in existence or which may be developed in the fore-
seeable future."
FCC 50-1064, pp. 47-48 (Sept. 1, 1950).
14 The incorporation of bracket standards would permit such receivers to
receive black and white pictures from present transmissions, CBS color trans-
missions, and any other transmissions within a range of 15,000 to 32,000 lines
per second and 50 to 150 fields per second. FCC 50-1064 (Sept. 1, 1950).
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isting monochrome television system. The stated purpose of such
standards was to preserve the status quo on compatibility.15 In com-
ments received on the proposal, it was the almost unanimous opinion
of the industry that such bracket standards were impractical and
moreover not capable of being produced within the time limits fixed.16
R.C.A. subsequently requested the Commission to view the im-
provements made in its system and to view further experimental
broadcasts, which request was denied. No testimony, oral or writ-
ten, was received after the issuance of the first report, but on October
10, 1950, the Commission issued its second report,17 which concluded
that the field sequential or C.B.S. system was the most satisfactory
and should be adopted. The effective date of the order is November
20, 1950. To this report, R.C.A. objected. Accordingly, suit was
filed in the United States District Court to enjoin, set aside, annul
and suspend the order.'8
The court, by a two to one decision, allowed summary judgment
for the defendants, United States and Federal Communications Com-
mission, but continued in effect a temporary injunction restraining
and suspending the promulgation, operation and execution of the
order. The District Court held that it had only limited scope in re-
view, and that the controversy badly needed the finality of a decision
of the United States Supreme Court. It was also decided that the
evidence sought to be introduced by plaintiffs was outside of the rec-
ord, and that a hearing of such would amount to a trial de novo. The
temporary restraining order was allowed to stand pending review by
the Supreme Court because of the public interest involved and the
irreparable injury which would result to plaintiffs from the promul-
gation of the order.
On March 5, the F.C.C. motion in the Supreme Court to affirm
the decision of the District Court was denied, and the case was argued
before the Supreme Court on March 26, 1951. While it would be
presumptuous to attempt to predict the decision which will be ren-
dered, it is well to briefly review the communication law on the ques-
tions which will doubtlessly be raised in connection with the facts of
the instant controversy and the decision of the District Court.
I. Public Interest
The guiding statutory standard for the Commission as set forth
in the Communications Act of 1934 is the "public interest, conveni-
ence, or necessity." 19 This statutory standard is not without specific
15 FCC 50-1064 (Sept. 1, 1950).
:1 FCC 50-1224 (Oct. 10, 1950).
'7Ibid.
8 Radio Corporation of America v. United States and Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 95 F. Supp. 660 (N. D. Ill. 1950), cert. granted, 71 Sup.
Ct. 507 (1951).
'948 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 50 STAT. 190 (1937), 47 U. S. C.
§303 (1946).
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meaning and limitations. The Supreme Court has stated, quoting
with approval from earlier decisions:
The touchstone provided by Congress was the "public interest, convenience, or
necessity," . . "This criterion is not to be interpreted as setting up a
standard so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power. .. "
The "public interest" to be served under the Communications Act is thus
the interest of the listening public in the "larger and more effective use of
radio".... 20
That private litigants have standing to sue only as representa-
tives of this larger and more important public interest, and that a
court has the same power to protect public as well as private rights
was held in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission.21 "Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much
farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public
interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests
are involved." 2 2 An action to set aside an order of an administra-
tive agency on the ground of public interest is a "plenary suit in
equity." 23
The guide post given to the Commission as a measure of the
public interest is "the larger and more effective use of radio." 24 The
Commission in its Report of May 28, 1940 25 found that in the public
interest television transmission standards must (a) permit all re-
ceivers to obtain all pictures,26 (b) permit the best possible perfor-
mance but still leave room for all foreseeable improvements, 7 and
(c) be adopted only after full research and after industry is in agree-
ment upon them.28
One question therefore is whether or not the adoption of the
C.B.S. system is in the furtherance of the public interest, convenience,
20 National Broadcasting Company v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 216
(1943).
21316 U. S. 4 (1942).
22 Virginian Railway Co. v. Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 552 (1937).
23 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407,
415 (1942).2448 STAT. 1032 (1934), as amended, 50 STAT. 190 (1937), 47 U. S. C.
§303(g) (1946).25 In the Matter of Order No. 65 Setting Television Rules and Regulationsfor Further Hearing, FCC Docr No. 5806 (May 28, 1940).
26 "It would be a violation of its statutory obligations for the Commission
to disregard any facts which might foreclose a proper exercise of its duty to
fix transmission standards for a single uniform system of television broad-
casting." Id. at 19.
27 "In its regulation of television in the public interest, the Commission, in
the light of the evidence before it, has set as its goal unfettered technical
development and engineering advance. In dealing with the problem of setting
television transmission standards the Commission has, therefore, sought to
avoid action which would freeze the state of the art at an unsatisfactory level
of performance." Id. at 3.
25 "If technical research having this goal is retarded or halted, the Com-
mission's duty to fix transmission standards with due regard for considerations
of public interest will have been, for all practical purposes, nullified." Id. at 26.
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or necessity inasmuch as it (1) involves a change in and violates the
standards 29 previously adopted and stated to be for "the larger and
more effective use of radio," 30 (2) deprives the public of compatible
color even though the Commission itself as well as the leaders of the
industry have declared a compatible system to be most desirable,31
and (3) entails the expenditure by the public of millions of dollars
in converting their sets in order to receive such color telecasts in
ordinary black and white, and many more millions to receive them
in color.
II. Authority of the Commission
The authority of the Commission to set television transmission
standards has never been before the courts. No express authority
to do such is to be found in the Communications Act. The only
specific statutory authority from which such a power can be inferred
is Section 303(e) which authorizes the Commission to:
Regulate the kind of apparatus to be used with respect to its external effects
and the purity and sharpness, of the emissions from each station and from the
apparatus therein; 32
To infer from this language the broad jurisdiction to set transmis-
sion standards would seem to be at best a doubtful inference. No one
heretofore challenged the Commission's authority, however, since the
industry fully appreciated the desirability of standards which would
provide "a fair degree of efficiency and assure to the public in basic
outline a single uniform system of broadcasting which will enable
every transmitting station to serve every receiver within its range." 33
Therefore, though no express authority was to be found in the stat-
utes, the power was acquiesced in by the industry from practical
necessity. But whether or not it is within this power to abandon
the decade old policy of uniform single standards, to set bracket
standards, 3 4 to adopt an incompatible system,3 5 and to prohibit com-
patible systems which would not interfere with the present service
and reception 36 is the question presented to the Supreme Court. The
District Court did not pass upon the power of the Commission to
adopt standards,37 and it would appear that the plaintiff is entitled to
a judicial determination of this question.
29 See notes 25, 26, 27 and 28 supra.
ao See note 24 supra.
31 FCC 50-1064 (Sept. 1, 1950).
3248 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 50 STAT. 190 (1937), 47 U. S. C.
§303(e) (1946).
33 Report of the Conmissian in the Matter of Order No. 65 Setting Tele-
vision Rules and Regulations for Further Hearing, FCC DocKET No. 5806,
p. 2 (May 28, 1940).
34 FCC 50-1224 (Oct. 10, 1950).
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
3 See note 18 supra.
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III. Violation of Duty by Commission-Arbitrary and Capricious
The Administrative Procedure Act, in its sections dealing with
rule making proceedings, provides:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall afford interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to present the
same orally in any manner; and, after consideration of all relevant matter
presented, the agency shall incorporate in any rules adopted a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose.38
The Commission itself has recognized this proscription and
stated that in making "rules and regulations, and engineering
standards,. . it must conform to the Administrative Procedure Act
which prescribes uniform rule-making practices for Federal agencies
to follow." 39 The Supreme Court likewise has held that Section 303
of the Communications Act 40 imposes a "comprehensive mandate." 41
This mandate would seem to include the duty to seek out and con-
sider all relevant information. With regard to this mandate the
Commission has recognized that it would be a violation of its statu-
tory duties to disregard any relevant facts in fixing transmission
standards.42
The discretion allowed to a federal agency is not without limits. 4
The Commission in this case issued its second report 44 adopting the
C.B.S. system without considering any new evidence in the interim
period since its first report 45 in which it stated that none of the pro-
posed systems was ready for use by the public. The findings were
therefore based on evidence and demonstrations from an early part
of the hearing. Inasmuch as during this interim period the Com-
mission refused to view the R.C.A. improvements and Progress
Reports 46 or the report of the Condon Committee,47 there is a seri-
ous question as to whether this action constituted such an abuse of
discretion as to be arbitrary and capricious.
3 8 ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEOuRE ACT §4(b), 60 STAT. 238, 5 U. S. C.§ 1003(b) (1946).
39 16 FCC ANN. REP. 13-14 (1950).
4048 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 50 STAT. 190 (1937), 47 U. S. C. A.
§ 303(g) (1946).
41 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 219 (1943).4 2 1; the Matter of Order No. 65 Settinq Television Rudes and Regulations
for Further Hearing, FCC DocxcT No. 5806 (May 28, 1940).
43 See Regents of University System of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U. S. 586(1950) ; WOKO v. Federal Communications Commission, 329 U. S. 223 (1946) ;
Yankee Networks v. Federal Communications Commission, 107 F. 2d 212(D. C. Cir. 1939).
"4FCC 50-1224 (Oct. 10, 1950).
4GFCC 50-1064 (Sept. 1, 1950).
46 RCA PROGRESS REPoRT of July 31, 1950.
47 Report of the Advisory Committee on Color Television to the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, SEN. Doc. No.
197, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
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IV. Competition
The Supreme Court has held that:
... the Act recognizes that the field of broadcasting is one of free competi-
tion. The sections dealing with broadcasting demonstrate that Congress has
not .. . abandoned the principle of free competition... 48
And in the same case it was stated that:
Congress intended to leave competition in the business of broadcasting where
it found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with other
broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his pro-
grams attractive to the public. 4 9
The effect of the present order of the Commission 10 is to pro-
hibit competition between compatible and non-compatible color tele-
casts, even though there would be no electrical interference between
them,51 whereas the general policy of the Act has been to encourage
competition.52
There is therefore presented to the Court for decision the very
important and substantial question of the power of the Commission
to suppress competition in color television. And if this should be
decided in the affirmative, there is the further question of whether,
in this particular case, the power was validly exercised since there
are no findings in either the -first 53 or second 54 reports that such
was necessary to the public interest, and indeed, no evidence to show
that the problem was considered.
V. The Opinion of the District Court
The decision of the District Court 55 was predicated on the fact
that any determination made by them was appealable as a matter of
right to the Supreme Court. The majority concluded that the action
was a mere "practice session" 56 for the "big battle" " before the
Supreme Court. The issue cannot therefore be said to have been
litigated since little more was done than to refer the parties to the
Supreme Court for decision.
48 Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,
309 U. S. 470, 474 (1940).
49 Id. at 475.
50 FCC 50-1224 (Oct. 10, 1950).
51 FCC 50-1064 (Sept. 1, 1950).
52 Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,
309 U. S. 470 (1940); Mansfield Journal Co. v. Federal Communications Com-
mission, 180 F. 2d (D. C. Cir. 1950).
53 See note 51 supra.
54 See note 50 supra.
55 Radio Corporation of America v. United States and Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 95 F. Supp. 660 (N. D. Ill. 1950), cert. granted, 71 Sup.
Ct. 507 (1951).
56 Id. at 664.
57 Ibid.
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It was held, however, that the court could not substitute its
discretion for that of a federal agency acting within the bounds of
its power, and that error or unwisdom did not amount to an abuse
of discretion.'; And further that the judgment of an administrative
agency, if based on substantial evidence and within the limitations
of its statutory power, could not be disturbed by the courts even if
on the same record the court would have arrived at a different con-
clusion.5 9  These, however, are established principles, controverted
by no one, and approved in the leading case, National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, in which the court stated:
Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was
based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority
granted by Congress.... The responsibility belongs to the Congress for the
grant of valid legislative authority and to the Commission for its exercise.60
This limited scope of the court is not challenged. What the
Court must decide is whether, within the scope of judicial review;
the evidence presented will support a finding that the Commission
acted outside of its power and did in fact abuse its discretion. This
the opinion of the lower court failed to decide.
The Commission has taken the position that it was legally pre-
cluded from considering evidence presented in the interim period
between its first and second reports.6 The District Court likewise
decided that it (the court) could not consider any evidence outside
of the record of the Commission. 62  If such is the law, then there
is in effect no provision for judicial review. If the reviewing court
may not hear the evidence upon which the charge of abuse of dis-
cretion is predicated, how can any order of a federal agency be suc-
cessfully challenged? Judicial review of orders of the Commission
is specifically provided for by Section 402 of the Communications
Act of 1934.6 The scope of this review is defined in Section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act,64 and includes the right to
set aside orders on the ground that they are unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence, are arbitrary and capricious, or are an abuse of
discretion. It is submitted that evidence ignored by the Commission
may be heard by the court in order to determine if the Commission
has or has not violated its statutory duty to consider all relevant
evidence. 65
68 Citing American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. United States, 219
U. S. 232 (1936).59 Citing Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U. S.
218 (1943).
60 319 U. S. 190, 244 (1943).
61 FCC 50-1224 (Oct. 10, 1950).
62 See note 55 supra.
6348 STAT. 926 (1934), as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. § 402(a) (Supp. 1950).
64 ADMINISTRAIV PRocEntmR ACT §10(e), 60 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C.§ 1009(e) (1946).65ADMINISTRATIW PRocEauRE AcT § 4(b), 60 STAT. 238, 5 U. S. C.
§ 1003(b) (1946).
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VI. Conclusion
There are, therefore, presented to the Court four basic questions:
(1) Has the Commission the power to set transmission
standards ?
(2) Granting the power, has the Commission exercised it in
the "public interest, convenience, or necessity"?
(3) By refusing to hear evidence on the most recent develop-
ments has the Commission violated its duty and acted arbitrarily?
(4) Has the Commission the right to restrict competition in
color television broadcasting where there is no electrical interference?
It would be presumptuous in this article to indicate what the
Supreme Court will or should rule. However, the impact of the
decision will so affect the public that a few observations are in order.
The Federal Communications Commission and the leaders of
the industry are in unanimous agreement that a compatible system of
color television is the most desirable. The acceptance of an incom-
patible system at this time was stated to be primarily for the very
purpose of not further aggravating the compatibility problem. If,
however, there is in fact on the horizon a truly compatible system
which will completely solve the problem, instead of merely abating
the damage, it would seem most reasonable to allow that system every
opportunity to prove its acceptability. For ten years the Commission
has held back acceptance of a non-compatible system because of its
recognized shortcomings. The interest of the millions who now
own television receivers and who will be harmed by the promulgation
of the order constitutes a very large and very tangible portion of
the public interest. If it is in their interest to postpone promulgation
of the order until the very latest information is considered then it
is clearly in the public interest to do so.
The trend in recent years has admittedly been to enlarge, not
diminish, the power and discretion of administrative agencies. The
courts are slow to declare that the bounds of statutory auth6rity have
been overstepped. Especially is this true where technical knowledge
and skill are the dominant factors in the decision. It is, however,
still the correct function and duty of the court to see that, in arriving
at a decision and in applying the specialized knowledge of experts,
there is no abuse of this discretion and that there is a strict adherence
to duty.
Still another important consideration is the principle of free
competition in the market, and public choice. Along with civil liber-
ties, this portion of the American heritage has been jealously guarded
and, protected. Only when a clear public need for uniformity and
suppression of waste, as in the case of public utilities, has been
demonstrated, has this principle been abandoned. Radio broadcast-
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ing has never been held to be in this category. The choice of program
and set and the failure or success of a broadcaster has been left to
the public. The approval or rejection of the Commission's decision
will decide whether or not these same principles will apply to color
telecasts.
Whatever the decision of the court, and whichever system of
color television broadcasting is finally approved, the controversy
will at last have the finality of a decision of the United States Su-
preme Court. There will have been a substantial contribution to a
new field of law-television law. Under this law the industry will
grow and perfect itself. In this way there will best be served the
"public interest, convenience, or necessity."
X
MUST THIE REMEDY AT LAw BE INADEQUATE BEFORE A
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST WILL BE IMPRESSED?
Introduction
Generally speaking, a constructive trust is a trust by operation
of law, which arises contrary to intention 1 against one, who by
fraud, commission of wrong, abuse of confidential relationship or
by any form of unconscionable conduct, or who in any way against
the rules of equity and good conscience has either obtained or holds
and enjoys the legal title to property, which in justice he ought not
hold and enjoy.2 It is a procedural device raised by equity in order
to administer complete justice between the parties.3
1 In an illuminating article classifying trusts according to intent, the "in
invitum"' quality of constructive trusts is employed as grounds for labeling
such trusts "fraud-rectifying" as distinguished from "intention enforcing"
express and resulting trusts. Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as Ex-
press, Resulting, and Constructive, 27 HAuRv. L. Rsv. 437, 462 (1914).
2 "A constructive trust bears much the same relation to an express trust
that a quasi-contractual obligation bears to a contract. In the case of a con-
structive trust, as in the case of quasi-contract, an obligation is imposed not
because of the intention of the parties but in order to prevent unjust enrich-
ment." 3 ScoTT oN TRUSTS §462.1 (1939) (hereafter cited as Scowt). RE-
STATEMENT, REsTrruTioN § 160, comment a (1937) (hereafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT), makes the same analogy.
3 "Generally speaking, the constructive trusts . .. are not trusts at all in
the strict and proper signification of the word 'trusts'; but . . . courts are
agreed in administering the same remedy in a certain class of frauds as are
administered in fraudulent breaches of trusts, and . . . courts and the pro-
fession have concurred in calling such frauds constructive trusts . . . "
1 PERRY ON TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 166 (6th ed. 1911) (hereafter cited as
PERRY).
Cardozo, J., in his customary aphoristic manner, expresses the same thought
in the following ways: "A constructive trust is, then, the remedial device
through which preference of self is made subordinate to loyalty to others."
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